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ABSTRACT 
We present some new ways of looking at economic systems. TI1e aspect 
of human behavior which we emphasize is that individuals' judgments entail 
errors (they sonetimes reject good projects and accept bad projects). The 
aspect of an economic system on which we focus is its architecture; that 
is, how the decision making units are organized together within a system, 
who gathers what information, and who communicates what with whom. The 
architecture of a system affects its performance not only because it in­
fluences the nature of errors which individuals make within the system, 
but also because it has a critical effect on the aggregation of individuals' 
errors. We analyze and compare the performance of two polar architectures, 
with decentralized (polyarchical) versus centralized (hierarchical) deci­
sion making authorities. Also, we discuss several extensions of our 
analysis. 
1HE ARQiITECTURE OF ECONOMIC SYSTEMS: 
HIERARQiIES AND POLYARCHIES 
By Raaj Kumar Sah and Joseph E. Stiglitz* 
There is a widespread belief that the performance of an economic 
.system is influenced by its internal organization. Yet, there is very little 
in traditional economic .analysis which investigates such a relationship. 1 
In this paper, we present some new ways of looking at economic organizations. 
Although we motivate our discussion in the context of a comparison of econo­
mies, our analysis has implications for the internal structure of large 
business organizations as well. 
The thesis of this paper is that central to an understanding of the 
performance of an economic system is an understanding of its architecture, 
The architecture (like that of a computer or electrical system) describes, 
among other things, how the constituent decision making uni ts are arranged 
together in a system, how the decision making authority is distributed within 
a system, who gath.ers what information, and who communicates what with whom. 
The feature of human behavior which plays a central role in our analy­
sis is that all decision makers make errors of judgment. For concreteness 
we focus on decisions which involve accepting or rejecting certain projects. 
Individuals (or the constituents of economic systems) make these decisions 
based on the information ·available to them, and errors in judgment arise 
since information is almost never complete. As a result, some projects 
which. get accepted should have been rejected, and some projects which are 
rejected should have been accepted. Using an analogy from the classical 
2 
theory of statistical inference, these errors correspond to Type-II and 
Type-I errors. 
The two specific architectures which we study in this paper are what 
we call polyarchies and hierarchies. We think of a polyarchy as a system 
in which there are several (and possibly competing) decision makers who can 
undertake projects (or ideas) independently of one another. In contrast, 
decision making authority is more concentrated in a hierarchy in the sense 
that only a few individuals (or, only one individual) can undertake projects 
while others provide support in decision making. Clearly, these architec­
tures are suggestive of a market-oriented economy and a bureaucracy-oriented 
economy. 2 
The issue of the relative merits of these two polar forms of economic 
organization has long been debated, but there is a surprising lacuna of 
analytical research. Of the standard arguments in favor of decentrali za­
tion, there are three about which we will have nothing to say in the present 
paper: the alleged link between economic and political decentralization 
(.and the corresponding view that polyarchical forms of economic organiza­
tion are a necessary concomitant of a democratic society); the view that 
a decentralized economic structure provides an efficient method for solving 
a once-and-for-all allocation problem; 3 and the view that better incentive 
mechanisms can often be designed within decentralized economic systems. 4 
Our analysis will, however, cast light on several other aspects of 
the debate concerning the relative merits of polyarchies versus hierarchies: 
advocates of polyarchies point out that a good project has many opportuni­
ties (chances) of being accepted in their system, while critics contend 
that polyarchies fail to provide adequate checks against incompetent deci­
sion making. Critics of hierarchical structures claim that there is a high 
3 
cost to providing these checks; there are direct costs of additional evalu­
ations, and there are indirect costs because good projects get rejected in 
the process of ensuring that bad projects do not get undertaken. But then 
the critics of polyarchies object to the extra costs involved in duplica­
tive evaluation of the same project by different individuals (or organiza­
tions) and, more generally, to the consequences of failing to coordinate 
in the presence of externalities. Finally, advocates of polyarchies point 
to its virtues in economies of communication and its stimulative effects 
on innovation. 5 'Ib,ere is a ,grain of truth in each of these views. The 
question is, under what circumstances does a polyarchy perform better, or 
worse, than a hierarchy. The model we present in this paper provides a 
framework for answering this • 
A key consequence of how individuals are arranged together is that 
the aggregation of their errors is different under different economic sys­
tems. The aggregation of errors, in turn, influences the performance of 
a system. For example, in a market economy, if one firm rejects a profit­
able idea (say, for a new product), then there is a possibility that some 
other firm might accept it. In contrast, if a single bureau makes such 
decisions and this bureau rejects the idea, then the idea must remain 
unused. The same, however, is also true for those ideas which are unprofi t­
able. As a result, one would expect a greater incidence of Type-II error 
in a polyarchy, and a greater incidence of Type-I error in a hierarchy. 
The architecture of a system influences not only the aggregation of 
individuals' errors but also the nature of errors which different individ­
uals make. We posit that individuals use rational decision rules to accept 
or reject projects, based on the information available to them. The infor­
mation available to a person consists of what he collects directly and what 
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he receives from others, each entailing costs and benefits. In general, 
therefore, the information available to individuals, and the (imperfect) 
decision rules based on them which individuals employ,will differ across 
economic systems. 
The costs of acquiring and communicating information (leading to mis­
judgments by individuals) are thus central features of the technology under­
lying our analysis. These costs include the direct costs (time and resources) 
and the indirect costs which result from the inevitable contamination that 
occurs in the process of information communication. Communication, like 
decision making, is always imperfect. No individual ever fully communicates 
perfectly what he knows to another. 
Another important feature is the limited capacities of individuals 
to gather, absorb, and process information within a limited amount of time. 
This is why organizations, groups of individuals, may be able to do more 
(make better decisions) than any single individual. But the fact that 
communication is costly and imperfect means that an organization with two 
individuals, each of whom can process a given amount of information, in 
say a month, is not the same as a single individual who has the capacity 
of processing twice that amount of information within the same time period. 
It also means that how people are arranged within an organization, who they 
communicate with under what circumstances, has important implications for 
the performance of the organization. 
The paper is organized as follows. We begin, in Section I, by present­
ing a simple model of the decision structure within a polyarchy and a 
hierarchy. In Section II, we assume that the nature of individuals' errors 
and the mix of available projects is exogenously specified, and analyze 
how changes in these exogenous features influence the performance of the 
5 
two systems. We also compare the performance of the two systems assuming 
that the exogenous parameters faced by the two systems are similar. The 
difference in the performance of the two systems is thus attributable to 
their differences in architecture. 
In Section III, we discuss the collection and processing of informa­
tion in the two systems. In particular, we show how (Bayesian) screening 
rules- are determined which, in turn, provide an endogenous characterization 
of the nature of errors made by individuals in the two systems. Several 
extensions of our aJiproach are outlined in Section IV. We comment oncer­
tain organizational forms other than hierarchies and polyarchies, and also 
on those forms in which the decisions to undertake projects are based on 
veto~s rather than on acceptances. In addition, we discuss certain economic 
factors, other than the lack of complete information, which may affect the 
performance of organizations. Concluding remarks are presented at the end 
of the paper. 
I. 11:IE MODEL 
In the following model, a polyarchy consists of two firms, and a hier­
archy consists of two bureaus. The task of a bureau or a firm is to screen 
projects. Each project has a scalar (net) benefit, which can be positive, 
negative, or zero. A screen (that is, a bureau or a firm) evaluates every 
project and accepts or rejects the project. 6 
Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here 
The decision process in a polyarchy and a hierarchy are depicted in 
Figure 1 and 2 respectively. In a polyarchy, the two firms screen the 
initial final
portfolio portfolio 
Figure 1: Polyarchy 
bureau 1 bureau 2 
initial final
portfolio portfolio,----..1 I 
Figure 2: Hierarchy 
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projects independently. For specificity, one may think of projects arriv­
ing randomly (with probability one-half) at one of the two firms. If a 
particular project is accepted by a firm, then it is no longer available 
to the other firm. If the project is rejected, then it goes to the other 
firm where, once again, it can be accepted or rejected. Neither firm screens 
the same project twice, so that a project can not cycle back and forth be-
f . 7tween 1rms. The portfolio of projects selected in a polyarchy therefore 
consists _of the projects accepted separately by each of the two firms. 
In contrast, in a hierarchy, all projects are first evaluated by the 
lower bureau (bureau 1) ; those which are accepted are forwarded to the higher 
bureau (bureau 2) and others are discarded. The projects selected by the 
system then are those which are selected by the higher bureau. Drawing an 
analogy from the design of relay circuits, the screens are placed in series 
in a hierarchy whereas they are placed in parallel in a polyarchy. 
The superscripts P and H represent a polyarchy and a hierarchy 
respectively. For brevity, we use the superscript s , where s = P or 
H • X denotes the expected net benefit (profit) from a project, 8 and 
ps (_x) denotes the probability that this project will pass through a screen 
in the system. We refer to ps(x) as the screening function and assume, 
at present, that the screening functions corresponding to the two screens 
within a system are identical. Then the probabilities that the project 
x will be accepted in the system s , denoted by £5(x) , are given by9 
We refer to the portfolio of projects available to an economic system 
7 
as the initial portfolio and the portfolio that it selects as the final 
portfolio. For system s , Ns denotes the number of projects in the ini­
tial portfolio, and gs(x) denotes its probability density function. The 
initial portfolio contains both profitable and unprofitable projects, that 
is, there are projects with positive as well as negative x's •
10 
The final portfolios represent how the economic systems have performed. 
These can be characterized using many different summary statistics. For 
, example, the fraction of initial projects selected by the systems, denoted 
by ns , is given by 
(_3) ns = E[t'] , 
in which E denotes the expectation operator; the expectation is calculated 
with respect to the density function for the system. On the other hand, 
if we are interested in studying the profitability of alternative systems, 
then an important statistic is the (expected) profit. We denote this by 
Ys , which is 11 
Screening function: The screening function p(x) denotes the prob­
abilities that projects with different levels of profit have of being 
accepted by a bureau or a firm. It is a reduced form representation of 
the error making properties of a screen. It can take any form, provided 
(5). 1 ~· p(x) > O 
for all X , and the strict inequalities hold for at least some X • 
12 
Two properties of the screening function are of special interest. The 
8 
13first is its slope, If p (x) is positive then a project with
X 
higher profit has a higher local probability of being accepted by a screen. 
If p (x) = 0 , then the screening is indiscriminate, since it does not
X 
distinguish between a better and a worse project. While it is possible that 
the sign of Px may change over the range of projects, we consider here 
only those screens which have at least some, but not complete, discriminat-
ing ability throughout the range of projects. That is, > 0 for allPx ' 
X • Further, if p and p 1 represent two screens, and if ' Px(z) > p 
1 (z) ,
X 
then we refer to the former .,screen as locally more discriminating at X = z 
;J:t 
. 
Toe second important property of screens is the level of p(x) • If 
p(z) > p1(z) then we call the former screen locally slacker, and the latter 
locally tighter, at x = z • 
In some cases examined in this paper, we employ linear screening func­
tions. The corresponding conclusions hold approximately for those screens 
for which the curvature of p(x) is small. In such cases, p(x) is ex­
pressed as 
where p = p(µ) , and µ is the mean of the initial portfolio, that is. 
µ = E[x] • Thus, p is the probability that the average project will pass 
through a screen. Clearly, a higher p and imply globally higher 
slackness and discriminating capability. 
If screening were perfect, then all projects with x > 0 would be 
accepted and those with x < 0 would be rejected; that is, p(x) = 1 if 
x > 0 , and p(x) = 0 if x < 0 • In this case, the performances of a 
polyarchy and a hierarchy are identical in every respect, as can be easily 
verified from (1) and (2). Thus, the architecture of economic systems might 
9 
cease to be a relevant issue, if one believes that human decision making 
is absolutely faultless. Even a casual observation of actual functioning 
of business and public organizations, however, makes it abundantly clear 
that errors of judgment are an integral part of human decision making. 
This realization not only makes it necessary to recast the traditional 
view of organizations, but it also provides a potential basis for under­
standing certain hitherto unrecognized differences among different types 
of organizational systems. 
II. PORTFOLIOS SELECTED IN ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS 
We investigate two questions in this section. First, how is the port­
folio selected in each of the two systems affected by the exogenous param­
eters representing the initial portfolios and the characteristics of the 
screens? Second, what is the relative performance of the final portfolios 
in the two systems, and how is this influenced by the exogenous parameters? 
To examine the second question, we assume that the two systems have the 
same initial portfolios and screening functions; the difference in their 
performance is thus solely attributable to the difference in their architec­
ture. This assumption is not required for examining the first question 
since it does not involve any comparison across the systems. The two sta­
tistics for evaluating the final portfolio which we employ are the propor­
tion of original projects selected, and the profit from the final portfolio. 
A. The Size of Final Portfolios 
The proportion of the initial portfolio selected by the two systems, 
ns is given in (3). Denoting the difference in these proportions by 
6n, we find that 
10 
p
(7) Lln = n nH > 0 , since 
(8) fp - /f = 2p(x){l - p(x)} > 0 , 
from (5), and it is strictly positive for some x. Therefore: A polyarchy 
selects a larger proportion of initial projects than a hierarchy. 
The reason behind this result is intuitive. Consider a hypothetical 
situation in which the second firm in a polyarchy does not exist, and the 
higher bureau in a hierarchy does not exist. The proportion of projects 
accepted in the two~systerns, would then be ~he same, namely, E[p(x)] • 
Since the second firm accepts at least some projects, and since the higher 
bureau rejects at least some projects, the actual proportion of projects 
accepted in a polyarchy must exceed that in a hierarchy. It is also obvious 
that this result holds for good as well as bad projects. Further, the re­
sult does not depend on how one defines good versus bad projects, provided 
there is some probability that a screen will accept at least some good and 
some bad projects. 
Thus: A polyarchy accepts a larger proportion of good as well as bad 
projects compared to a hierarchy, no matter how one defines good and bad 
projects. Therefore, the incidence of Type-I error is relatively higher 
in a hierarchy, whereas the incidence of Type-II error is relatively higher 
in a polyarchy. 
The above result suggests that there may be circumstances in which a 
polyarchy performs better than a hierarchy (when it is more important to 
avoid Type-I errors) arid other circumstances in which a hierarchy performs 
better than a polyarchy (when it is important to avoid Type-II errors). 
We attempt to identify each of these situations in the next subsection. 
To determine the impact of initial portfolios on the sizt of final 
11 
portfolios, note from (1) and (2) that £5 (x) is increasing in x • Addi­
tionally, / (x) is concave and .-r1(x) is convex in x , if the screen­
ing function is linear. Therefore, the standard properties of statistical 
dominance (.under an assumption that the end points of the projects' dis tri­
bution are fixed) yield the following results. 
A worsening in the initial portfolio in the sense of first-order sto-
ch as tic dominance leads to a smaller proportion of initial projects being 
selected in both systems. With linear screening function, a mean preserving 
spread in the initial portfolio leads to a smaller proportion of initial 
projects being selected in a polyarchy, and a larger proportion being selected 
in a hierarchy. 
Insert Figure .3 about here 
These results can be seen in Figure .3. In this figure, fp and /I 
are concave and convex in X , since p in linear. ns is· the area above 
the x-axis bounded by the product of £5 and g . Naturally, this area 
corresponding to I is larger than that to 11 •. and this area enlarges, 
for both a polyarchy and a hierarchy, if the density weight g(x) shifts 
from lower x to higher x. Also, if the density weight shifts from the 
mean to the two sides, due to a mean preserving spread, then the area repre-
nssenting decreases in a polyarchy and it increases in a hierarchy. 
Explicit expressions for ns are derived in Appendix I(a), where the 
screening function is linear. From these expressions, one can ascertain 
how ns is influenced by changes in the screening function. We find that: 
With linear screening function, a higher slackness in screening raises the 




figure 3: Probabilities of Acceptance in Alternative Systems 
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ating ability in screening lowers the proportion selected in a po lyarchy, 
whereas it raises the proportion selected in a hierarchy. 
B. Profit in Alternative Systems 
Two Types of Projects: Consider an initial portfolio consisting of 
two types of projects, good and bad, with respective net profits andz1 
where are positive. The respective probabilities of approval 
by a screen are denoted by parameters p1 and Pz; that is, p1 = p(z1) , 
and Pz = p(-z2) • The initial portfolio contains a fraction a of good 
projects. AY = Yp - Y8 denotes the difference in the profit levels of 
15the two systems. Then from ( 4) 
An improvement in the initial portfolio in the present model is repre­
sented by a larger a or a larger z1/z2 • From (9), therefore: A better 
initial portfolio implies that the relative performance of a polyarchy, 
h . h . b 16compared to a ierarc y, is etter. 
The above expres-sion also allows us to demarcate the para.meters' space 
into two regions: one in which a polyarchy has a higher profit than a 
hierarchy, and the other in which the reverse holds. To see this in its 
simplest form, first assume that z1 = z2 = z , that is, a good and a bad 
project have symmetric gain and loss. Then the parameters which determine 
the sign of (9) are and a •
" 
Insert Figure 4 about here 











Figure 4: Comparison of a Polyarchy and a Hierarchy 
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below the 45-degree line, since screens have some discriminating capability; 
that is, > p2 • Now consider, for a moment, the case in which the ini­p1 
tial portfolio contains good and bad projects in equal proportions, that 
is, a= 1/2. Then a polyarchy has a higher profit in the region ODA 
while the reverse holds i-n the region ADB. That is, polyarchy has a 
higher profit if 
and the reverse holds othernise. 
This result has a simple explanation. Recall that (1 - p1) is a 
screen's Type-I error, that is, the probability of rejecting a good project; 
and is a screen's Type-II error, that is, the probability of accept­p2 
ing a bad project. Now, if a screen is more likely to reject a good pro­
ject than to accept a bad project, that is if (10) holds, then it must be 
the case that a polyarchy (which gives a second chance to the rejected 
projects) would do better. 
If the initial portfolio contains a smaller proportion of good projects, 
that is if a< 1/2 then from (9), we find that the parameter space is 
separated by a hyperbola like OEA, which is inside the region ODA. A 
polyarchy has a higher profit within the region OEA, and the reverse 
holds outside of it. The region OEA shrinks if the proportion of good 
projects in the initial portfolio is smaller, and it coincides with the line 
OA if a ➔ 0 • The opposite case, in which the initial portfolio contains 
a greater proportion of good project has a parallel implication. A polyarchy 
then has a higher profit outside of the region AFB and the reverse holds 
inside it. Not surprisingly, the two regions OEA and AFB coincide with 
with the triangles ODA and ADB respectively, as a tends to one-half. 
14 
The same figure allows us to visualize the case in which good and bad 
projects have different gain and loss, that is when As we havez1 I z2 • 
already noted z1/z2 plays a role analogous to a • Specifically, the 
line AD separates the two relevant regions in Figure 4 if 
a = z/ (z1 + z2) • A hyperbola like OEA is the boundary if either a 
or z1/z2 is smaller than what would satisfy the last equation. If a 
or z1/z2 is larger, on the other hand, then a hyperbola like AFB is the 
17relevant boundary. 
There is another way in which the results can be seen intuitively•.. 
b . d h . . 18Suppose tath we su Jecte eac proJect to two screenings. Clearly, if 
both screens indicated that the project was bad, the project should be re­
jected, and if both indicated that the project was good, it should be 
acc~pted. A trade off arises in those cases where there is a mixed review. 
Whether a project with a mixed review should be undertaken depends on the 
profit from such a project. The probability of a good project getting a 
mixed review is 2p1 (1 - p1) , while the probability of a bad project 
getting a mixed review is 2p2(1 - p2) • Hence the expected profit from 
projects with mixed reviews is the same as (9). 
Now, if it turns out that the expression (9) is positive, it means 
that projects with mixed reviews should be accepted; this is precisely 
what polyarchy ensures. Similarly, if it turns out that (9) is negative, 
it means that the projects with mixed reviews should be rejected, and this 
is precisely what hierarchy ensures. 
A General Project Portfolio: Before concluding this section, we briefly 
consider an initial portfolio consisting of a continuum of projects. Recall 
from (8) that fp - /I= 2p(l - p) • Then, ~y = 2E[~] where ~ = xp (1 p) . 
To determine the effect of a change in the initial portfolio (once again, 
15 
in the sense of first and second order stochastic dominance), we need the 
following derivatives of t/J 
(11) t/Jx = p(l - p) + x(l - 2p)px and 
(12) t/Jxx = 2 (1 - 2p)px - 2xp! + x(l - 2p)pxx • 
It is apparent that the above expressions can be positive or negative and, 
thus, the effect of a change in the initial portfolio is ambiguous in gen-
. l 19era • However, if the parameter values are restricted within certain 
ranges, then it is possible to predict certain effects. The simplest example 
is when the projects have values close to zero (that is, good projects have 
small positive profits and bad projects have small negative profits). Then 
from (11), t/J is increasing in x and, thus: A worsening in the initial 
portfolio in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance lowers the rela­
tive performance of a polyarchy. Also, if p(x) < 1/2 then, from (12), 
t/J is convex in x. In this case: A mean preserving spread in the initial 
portfolio improves the relative performance of a polyarchy. 
Another example of a restricted set of exogenous parameters is when 
the screening function is linear. The corresponding expression for ~y 
is presented in Appendix I(b). The relevant aspects of the initial port-
folio are now represented by its mean, variance and skewness. 20 
We find that when the initial portfolio is symmetric and has zero mean, 
a polyarchy performs better or worse than a hierarchy depending simply on 
whether p is less than or more than one-half, that is, whether the screen­
ing is tight or slack. A higher mean or a greater negative skewness, on 
the other hand, improves the relative performance of a polyarchy. The effect 
of a change in the mean is, of course, what we would have expected from 
16 
our earlier discussion of the case in which there are two types of pro­
jects. Further, if the initial portfolio has nonpositive skewness and 
mean, 21 and if the screening is tight (that is, if p < 1/2) then: 
(i) a polyarchy's relative performance improves if the variance in the 
initial portfolio is higher and, at a sufficiently high variance, a poly­
archy's profit is greater than that of a hierarchy, and (ii) a polyarchy's 
relative performance improves if the screens have greater discriminating 
ability. 
III. SCREENING RULES AND 'IHE ACQUISITION OF INFORMATION 
In the preceding section, the performance of decision makers (screens) 
was represented by exogenous screening functions, p(x) • In fact, these 
functions may be endogenous, and may differ markedly across organizations. 
It is thus conceptually possible that some of our earlier results may be 
altered when we take this endogenity into account. In this section, we 
show how optimal screening rules can be derived for decision making with 
imperfect information concerning the value of projects. Other possible 
determinants of the performance of individuals are discussed later. 
We posit that the information on projects is contaminated by random 
errors, so that a perfect inference is not always possible. A firm or a 
bureau collects information on projects, and the nature and the accuracy 
of information collected is influenced by the costs and the technologies 
of information acquisition and communication. The projects are then selected 
based on optimal (expected profit maximizing) rules concerning when to 
accept or reject a project. Though in some simple situations, it is clearly 
possible that the screening rules used within the two systems are identical; 22 
17 
in general, we would expect the screening rules to differ across the sys­
tems. The following comments clarify some of the sources of such differ-
ences. 
First, as remarked earlier, an important property of polyarchies is 
the independence (in decision making) of their constituent uni ts. Firms 
determine what is optimal for them (for example, what information to col­
lect and what screening rules to use) independently of one another. This 
independence, which we think is a central feature of market-like systems, 
also has its costs; in the sense that (in contrast to a hierarchy) 'no one' 
is maximizing the system's aggregate profit in a polyarchy. 
Second, the architecture of the economic system itself conveys some 
information to its constituents, which they will use in setting decision 
rules. For example, consider a polyarchy in which the firms do not share 
any information with one another (either because it is prohibited, or be­
cause it is too expensive). Even in this case, each firms knows that some 
of the projects it receives are those rejected by the other firm and, con­
sequently, the portfolio of projects faced by a firm is not an exact 
replica of the initial portfolio,· but it has been modified by the other 
firm. This implicit information will certainly be used by the firms. 
Third, the screening rules are influenced by the nature of informa­
tion sharing among the constituents of a system. For example, if firms 
in a polyarchy do not share any information with one another, then a firm 
can not distinguish between the projects which are being evaluated for the 
first time from those projects which were rejected by the other firm. 23 
A firm, therefore, must use the same screening rule for all projects that 
is receives. Now, consider a simple form of information sharing in which 
firms label rejected projects. In this case, a firm can use different 
18 
screening rules for the two categories of projects. At the same time, how­
ever, firms must also pay the cost of labelling. 
Similarly, in a hierarchy, if the lower bureau provides its observation 
to the higher bureau (at some cost), then the latter would screen projects 
~ing the observations made by both bureaus. If there is no information 
sharing between the bureaus, the upper bureau's screening will be based on 
its own observation, and on the knowledge of how the portfolio has been 
modified by the lower bureau, but not on what value was observed by the 
lower bureau for a particula.r
• 
project. Note also that a labelling of re-..;j; 
jected projects has no economic value in a hierarchy since these projects 
are not reevaluated. 
Though the extent of information sharing is likely to vary under dif­
ferent circumstances, it is clear from our earlier discussion that there 
is never perfect and complete information conununication. The assumption of 
limited coDDnunication plays a critical role in the subsequent analysis; 
we model here the polar case in which the firms in a polyarchy can not 
communicate at all, and the bureaus in a hierarchy communicate only binary 
signals (whether they think a project ·is good or bad); they cannot communi­
24cate their actual information concerning the characteristics of projects. 
We assume that a project evaluator observes the mean of the project 
with an error. He observes 
(13) y = X + 8 
where E[S] = 0 , and the distribution of 8 1.s independent across projects 
and observations. Project evaluators use reservation levels for screening; 
a project is accepted if its observed profit is above the reservation level, 
. . . d h . 25R , and 1.t 1.s reJecte ot erw1.se. Denote the distribution function of 
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e by L(e) • The screening function, then, is given by 
(14) p(x, R) _ Prob[y > R] = 1 - L(R - x) • 
The above expression yields P > 0 , and In other words, the X 
probability that a project is accepted by a screen is increasing in the 
quality of the project, and it is decreasing in the reservation level. 
This is what we would normally expect. 
In a polyarchy, denote the two firms by superscripts i and j • 
If Ri is the reservation level .for firm i , then pi =p(x, Ri) denotes 
the corresponding screening function. For firm i then, the probability 
that a given project will arrive to be evaluated for the first time is 1/2, 
and the probability that the same project will arrive after being rejected 
from firm j is (1 - pj)/2 Since these two kinds of arrivals can not 
be distinguished, the probability that a given project will arrive at firm 
i is and the probability that it will be selected is 
1 . .
zP1 (2 - pJ) • Thus, the profit of firm i is 
(15) 
From (15), it is clear that there is an externality associated with 
the reservation levels in a polyarchy: the more projects a firm rejects, 
the poorer the mix of projects reviewed by the other firm. 27 In the analy­
sis below, we restrict ourselves to the symmetric Nash optimum for the two 
firms in a polyarchy; the firm i maximizes (15) with respect to 
taking Rj as given. The resulting optimal reservation level is denoted 
by l . 
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In a hierarchy, Ri denotes the reservation level for the bureau i • 
The profit is 
_H 1 2
(17) y-- = E[xp p ] • 
The optimal reservation levels are denoted by RiH. We can compare the 
screening policies of the two systems under assumptions that the optimal 
reservation levels are internal for both systems, and that the optimal 
28 . . h .c h b . h. h Threservation level 1st e same ior t e two ureaus 1n a 1erarc y at 
is, RlH = R2H = RH~· In this case, RP is characterized by the first 
order condition of (15); that is, by 
It is easily verified that both sides of the above expression are negative 
numbers. 29 Thus, at1/aR = 2E[xppR] , evaluated at RP, is negative. 
HNow, aYH/aR = o at d1 and· Y is assumed strictly concave in R 
It follows that RP > Ji-I Thus: A polyarchy is more conservative in 
screening than a hierarchy. 
This result should not be surprising: while in a hierarchy, the lower 
bureau knows that any decision it makes will be rechecked at the upper 
bureau; and the upper bureau knows that all projects it receives have been 
checked at the lower bureau; in a polyarchy, each firm knows that its de­
cision will not be rechecked; and to make matters worse, it knows that the 
set of projects which it is examining includes many that have already been 
30examined elsewhere, and have been rejected. 
Since a polyarchy uses more conservative screening rules than a hier­
archy, we can no longer be sure that a polyarchy accepts more good projects, 
or that a hierarchy rejects more bad projects. This may, in turn, have a 
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critical effect on the relative performance of the two systems, as we shall 
see below. 
Two Types of Projects: Denote a screen's observations on good and 
bad projects by and A useful property of the reservation levels 
is seen as follows. Suppose for a moment that the reservation level in a 
screen is set at the highest observation that a bad project can yield; that 
is R = max y
2 
• Then, the bad projects are completely blocked, although 
many good projects might be rejected as a consequence. It is obvious that 
there is no gain in setting the reservation 1evel at a level higher than 
max y2 , since by doing so one loses additional good projects, without 
affecting bad projects (which are not being selected in any case). A 
parallel argument shows that there is no gain in setting R below the lowest 
observation that a good project can yield, at which level all good projects 
31are accepted. Thus 
(19) max y 
2 
> R > min y 
1 
For brevity, we refer to the upper and lower limit in (19) as the highest 
and the lowest reservation levels. 
In Appendix II, we have derived explicit solutions for symmetric pro­
jects, that is, z1 = z2 = z, when the observation errors are uniformly 
distributed with mean zero. The qualitative results are summarized below: 
(j) A worse initial portfolio corresponds to a tighter screening in 
both systems. This makes intuitive sense since a tighter screening implies 
a lower probability of acceptance for both good and bad projects, and this 
is more desirable if there is a smaller proportion of good projects in the 
... 1 f . 321n1t1a port 0110. 
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(ii) A polyarchy has a higher (lowe.r) profit than a hierarchy if the 
propartion of good projects in the initial portfolio is less (more) than 
one-half. Obviously, if one hypothesizes that unprofitable ideas typically 
outnumber the profitable ones in a portfolio, then the present example sug­
gests that a polyarchy is a superior institutional arrangement. This result 
reverses, in a sense, .our earlier conclusion that (with exogenous screening 
functions) the relative performance of polyatchy is worse if the initial 
portfolio is worse. This is because the screens in both systems now adjust 
their screening rules to take into account the quality of the initial port­
folio they are facing. When these adjustments are made then we find that, 
if faced with a bad portfolio, decision makers in both systems protect them­
selves by raising their reservation levels. But at the same time, firms 
in a polyarchy derive additional advantage from being able to give a second 
chance to the rejected projects. This improves their relative performance. 
Cost of Information Acquisition: Thus far, the accuracy of informa­
tion available to screens has been exogenously specified, and we have 
abstracted from the costs of information gathering. Organizations must 
also decide, however, on how much resources to spend on gathering informa­
tion. We represent information gathering as follows. The accuracy of a 
screen's observation can be influenced, to some extent, by affecting the 
distribution of errors associated with its observations. Higher accuracy 
costs more but it increases the probability of acceptance of good projects 
and lowers the probability of acceptance of bad projects. The distribution 
p(x, R, o) 1 L(R o) • Denote the cost per observation by C(o) • 
function of e is now represented by L(e, o) , where a higher o implies 
a greater accuracy. The corresponding screening function is 
= - - x, 
Then (15) and (.17) are modified as 
33 
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( 20) and 
Note that the cost of information now depends not only on the accuracy of 
observation, but also on how many projects are evaluated by a screen. 
Expression (20) shows that the firms in a polyarchy face an externality 
in information gathering; this externality is parallel to the one we dis­
cussed earlier concerning reservation levels. An improvement in the accuracy· 
of screening by firm j affects firm i's profit; some of the gains to 
firm j . represent the good projects that otherwise would have been under­
taken by f:trm i ; moreover, whenever firm j rejects a project, it in­
creases i's screening costs; as a result, firms 'overestimate' the return 
to screening. 
A hierarchy, on the other hand, faces a trade off whether to do a 
more accurate screening at the lower bureau or at the higher bureau. A 
higher quality screening at the lower bureau improves the portfolio to be 
evaluated by the higher bureau, but it also costs more because a larger 
number of projects is evaluated by the lower bureau. A lower quality 
screening at the lower bureau, on the other hand, imposes a potential cost 
because too many good projects might be thrown out of the system in this 
process. 
A general comparison of the accuracy of information in the two systems, 
however, is not possible; at the same reservation levels, the lower quality 
of the portfolio being reviewed by the firms in a polyarchy34 might lead 
to a higher expenditure on screening. Also, the overestimation of the re­
turns to screening may induce firms to spend more on screening. But since 
the reservation levels of firms may be higher, it is unclear whether the 
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marginal information has less (or more) value for firms at these higher 
reservation levels. 
IV. EXTENSIONS 
The objective of this paper has been to set out a basic framework within 
which the performance of alternative economic systems can be evaluated. 
The analysis can be extended in several ways. 
(a) Organizational Forms: We have examined here only two polar archi­
tectures, hierarchies and p~lyarchies. Another polar architecture which 
we have analyzed elsewhere is represented by committees which may differ 
both in their size and in their rules for decision making; for example, 
. . 1 h" d . . . 35maJority rue, two-t ir maJority. We view these polar architectures 
as building blocks for typical economic organizations which are complex 
mixtures of hierarchies, polyarchies, and committees. In market economies, 
for example, large firms often interact with one another in a polyarchical 
manner, while each of them itself is akin to a hierarchy. Also, firms and 
bureaus often have internal structures in which different types of informa­
tion is gathered and different types of decisions are made in different 
stages. For example, one often observes that projects are first evaluated 
on technical grounds, then on financial and economic grounds, and finally, 
on strategic and political grounds. 
(b) Initial Portfolio: Our comparison of alternative systems has been 
based on an assumption that the initial portfolio (described by g(x) and 
N) is the same for the two systems. Since the probabilities of acceptance 
of projects of different types differ across organizations, any given re­
ward structure (for acceptance of projects) will provide different incentives 
for project inventors in different organizations. For instance, recall that 
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if the screening function is exogenous, then the probability of having a 
project accepted by a hierarchy is always smaller. Thus, a hierarchy would 
have to provide greater rewards for accepted projects to induce the same 
effort level by inventors. 
(c) Alternative Decision Rules: We have followed the natural presump­
tion that a project is not undertaken unless it is approved by the organiza­
tion: within a hierarchy, by both bureaus; within a polyarchy, by at least 
one firm. We could, of course, imagine quite different organization of 
decision making: for instance, a hierarchy in which all projects are ac­
cepted except those which get vetoed by both bureaus and a polyarchy in 
which a project is accepted unless vetoed by one of the units. 
We refer to organizations operating according to the veto rule as a 
veto hierarchy and polyarchy, in contrast to those we have analyzed earlier, 
which we refer to as an acceptance hierarchy and polyarchy. It is easy 
to show that, in the absence of costs of coordination: An acceptance poly­
archy (hierarchy) is equivalent to a veto hierarchy (polyarchy). 36 
Note, however, that the coordination requirements may be markedly dif­
ferent depending on the architecture and the nature of decision rules. 
For instance, an acceptance polyarchy does not require any informational 
coordination among its constituent units; a firm does not need to send in­
formation to other firms concerning which projects it has rejected. This 
is an important aspect of the independence of firms within market-like 
systems, which we stressed earlier. In comparison, in a veto polyarchy 
(in which one unit can veto a project from being undertaken), a unit must 
inform other units which projects it has rejected. Similarly, in a veto 
hierarchy the lower bureau must inform the higher bureau which projects it 
has rejected. If there are significant costs to informational coordination, 
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then it is clear that an acceptance polyarchy may have an advantage over 
other organizational forms. 
{d} Selecting a Fixed Number of Projects: The organizations described 
above face no limit to the number of projects which could be undertaken; 
the only problem they face is to decide on screening rules such that the 
'marginal project undertaken has a positive expected value. We now briefly 
consider what happens when there are a fixed number of projects to be under-
taken. 37 Clearly, the projects undertaken will be those with the highest 
value of y, that is, those which appear to be the best. If the same ... 
initial portfolio is faced by alternative organizations, and if the number 
of proje,cts to be selected is large (out of an even larger portfolio) then 
this problem is roughly equivalent to the one in which organizations choose 
reservation levels so that a fixed proportion of the initial portfolio is 
selected. Denote this proportion by n • Now, recall from (7) that if 
both systems have the same screening rules (reservation levels), then the 
fractimi of projects selected by a polyarchy is higher than that by a hier­
archy. It follows then that in the present context: A polyarchy employs 
more conservative acceptance rules than a hierarchy. 
To see how the performance of the two systems can be compared, con­
sider the case in which there are two kinds of projects. Then the reserva-
tion levels in the two systems, and are obtained from 
(22) n = a½ + (1 - a) f~ 
where., as defined earlier, ? = p(x, RP) {2 - p(x, l)} , and 
sY = s a.z f1 1 - (1 - The 
profit can be rewritten, using (22), as ys = -nz2 + a.(zl It 
follows that 
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(23) ~y ~ 0 , if fi - ~ ~ 0 • 
The above expression has a clear intuition. Since both systems must select 
the same number of projects, their relative performance depends simply on 
which one of the two systems has a higher probability of accepting good 
projects. 
(e) Performance of Screens: In Section III, we argued that the per­
formance of screens within an organization is affected by the information 
implicit in the organization's architecture as well as by the resources 
spent on information gathering. Here we point out some other important 
aspects which may influence the performance of screens and, therefore, the 
performance of organizations. 
For instance, different individuals have different abilities; some 
individuals are better at screening (or make different types of errors) 
than do others. Different organizational architectures may also differ in 
(i) how sensitive their performance is to the assignment of individuals 
with different capabilities to different positions within the organization 
and (ii) how well they do in selecting individuals for different positions. 
The performance of organizations concerning the choice of decision makers 
can be studied in a manner parallel to our analysis of the choice of pro­
jects. It is obvious that the choice of decision makers within an organi­
zation is influenced by its architecture. This provides a basis for ana­
lyzing the 'rules of succession,' and what we call (in our 1985c paper) 
the self-perpetuating aspects of economic systems. 
Another characteristic of economic systems which affects their perform­
ance is the nature of rewards and punishments meted out to the decision 
makers. This has, of course, been the question around which much of the 
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recent li te.rature on incentives has focussed. In the present paper we have 
. d h. .not emph asize tis important aspect as much as it. deserves. 
38 Th·is is· 
because we think that some of the incentive problems are rather well under­
stood in what is already a vast literature, whereas the new aspects upon 
which we focus here have received insufficient attention. 
On the other hand, we should point out that the architecture of a sys­
tem may be critical in determining what reward systems are feasible and 
desirable in different systems. For example, in a hierarchical structure, 
promotions often constitute an important part of the rewards, a kind of 
reward which may or may not be desirable in a polyarchy. On the other hand, 
in polyarchical structures several parallel units perfonn similar functions, 
and it is possible to devise reward structures based on relative perform­
ance. These reward structures have been shown to have many desirable 
properties concerning incentive, risk, and flexibility (see footnote 4), 
and these may not be feasible in a hierarchical system. Different archi­
tectures may also differ in the degree of individual accountability which 
is feasible within them. One criticism of modern bureaucracies is, for 
example, that collective decision making makes it difficult to reward and 
punish bureaucrats individually. 
The architecture of an economic system affects the behavior of the 
organization in other ways as well, some of which have been extensively 
studied outside economics. Social psychologists have emphasized, for ex­
ample, that individuals' behavior may differ if they have participated in 
a decision making process compared to when they have been ordered to under­
take a particular task. Though these aspects of human behavior have not 
traditionally been incorporated into economic analysis, if they are impor­
tant determinants of economic behavior, for example, of the effort exerted 
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by individuals or of the quality of their decision making, then they should 
be. 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper has attempted to develop a new framework within which we 
can characterize and compare the performance of alternative ways in which 
the activities of society are organized. The particular aspect of human 
behavior on which we have focussed on is that much of human decision making 
entails errors of judgment. We have shown that the architecture of an 
organization influences what kind of error individuals make within the organi­
zation, and how individuals' errors add up to affect the organization's 
performance. Specifically, we have analyzed and compared the performance 
of two polar architectures (polyarchies and hierarchies) which have features 
of decentralized versus centralized decision making authority. 
Our approach in this paper has been positive and comparative. We have 
modelled specific economic systems and analyzed their performance, indi­
vidually and comparatively, to ascertain the set of circumstances under 
which one system performs better or worse than the other. 39 Though the 
problem of finding the optimum economic system, given a set of alternative 
systems and a set of external circumstances, is conceptually no different, 
w~ have refrained from emphasizing the normative aspects. This is in part 
because there is little reason to believe that societies choose their or­
ganizational form optimally. Indeed, given our arguments concerning the 
errors in making investment decisions, why should we expect an absence of 
errors in grand decisions, such as how to organize the societal structure 
itself. 
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Moreover, the problems of the design of economic systems are so com­
plex that it might not be reasonable to expect that one would find the 
best of all possible systems. The analogy to computer architecture is 
then suggestive: the standard question in this case is not to find the 
''best" architecture, since it is nearly impossible to find it, but to 
analyze the properties of alternative structures, with a view to identify 
.potential improvements. 
Although we have motivated the present analysis in the context of al­
ternative economic systems, 
., 
our approach has implications for the internal 
organization of large corporations as well. There are two main differences. 
First, certain kinds of externalities (such as the externali ty in screen... 
ing and information gathering in polyarchies, which we pointed out earlier) 
might be internalized by a corporation in setting its internal rules. 
Second, if one internal architecture is better than another (based on what­
ever the corporate criterion might be), then it might be more reasonable 
(in contrast to a societal situation) to expect a corporation to adopt the 
h
. 40better arc itecture. 
We have argued that there is more to the comparison of economic sys-
tems than is adequately reflected in the Lange-Lerner-Taylor analysis; there 
is more at stake than simply a comparison of alternative algorithms for 
arriving at a once-and-for-all allocation of society's resources. We hope 
we have convinced the reader that it is possible to construct simple models 
which reflect some important but hitherto unrecognized aspects of the com­
parison between alternative systems. In particular, we have suggested a 
basic parallelism between the sequence of decision making and the architecture 
of economic systems. Also, we have indicated how our analysis may be ex­
tended in a variety of ways. But, we would be the first to argue that our 
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present analysis is far from exhaustive. In our future work, therefore, 
we hope to study other important aspects of organizational architecture. 
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APPENDIX I 
(a) Substitution of (6) into (1) and (2) yields £5(x) for the linear 
screening function. From (3), then, we obtain 
H -2 2(Al) and n =p +pV 
~ X 
where V = E ( (.x - µ) 2] is the variance of the initial portfolio. There-
s - .. Hfore: an /ap > o , anp/ap < 0 , and an,-/ap > o . Also, note hereX X 
that the parameters ( p , and V ) can not take arbitrary values,Px 
because they must satisfy certain consistency requirements. For instance, 
from (7), we know that np > nH • Thus, from (Al) 
- - 2(A2) V < p(l - p)/px. 
(b) Recall that /::.Y = Yp - YH = E[x(fp - 11)] We obtain (fp - 11) , 
once again, by substituting (6) into (1) and (2). This yields 
(A3) 
3 3/2where n = E[(x - µ) ]/V is the coefficient of skewness and, from (A2), 
the expression within the first square bracket of (A3) is positive. There­
fore: a(6Y)/aµ > o , and a(6Y)/an < o . Also, if p < 1/2 , µ.::. o 
and n .::_ o , then (A3) yields: a(6Y)/aV > O , a(6Y)/ap < O and 
a(6Y)/apx > 0 . Further, under the same set of conditions, (A3) shows that: 
6Y > 0 , if V > -µp(l -p)/[(1- 2p)px - µp!] . Thus 6Y > 0 if V is 
sufficiently high. It is easily verified that this conclusion is unaffected 
by the restriction (A2) on how large V can be. 
A2 
APPENDIX II 
The distribution function of e is: L(e) = (8 + u)/2u if 
u 2._ e 2._ -u, L(e) = o if e < -u, and L(e) = 1 if e > u. Expres­
sion (19) yields 
(A4) -z + u > R > z - u. 
Define a parameter· o = z/u; a smaller o means larger errors in obser­
vation. Clearly, o > 0 for finite errors. Also, 1 > o , otherwise a 
perfect inference between good and bad projects is possible. Thus, 
l>o>O. 
Next, recall that p1 and denote the probabilities of acceptancep2 
(by a screen) of good and bad projects. From the above definition of L(8) , 
and from (14), we obtain p1 = (u + z - R)/2u, and p2 = (u - z - R)/2u, 
if R is within the range (A4). It follows then that 
The above expression allows a considerable simplification because we can 
use as the control variable to determine the optimal screening rules.p1 
From (A4), the range of p1 is: 1 ~ p1 ~ o • If p1 = 1 , then the low­
est reservation level is being chosen; if p1 = o , then the highest reser­
vation level is being chosen. For other values of p1 , the corresponding 
reservation level can be recovered from the definition of provided 
above. 
Using (AS) , we can express (15) and (17) as 
A3 
(A7) 
We focus on the symmetric optimum in a polyarchy. The optimal value of 
p
in this case is denoted by p1 : The optimal p1
1 s for a hierarchyp1 
2H are denoted by PiH and p . The optinrurn in a polyarchy is characterized
1 
by 
p yP 2(AS) = 1 and = za - z ( 1 - a) ( 1 - c5 ) , if Cl > (1 +cS)/(2 +c5)P1 ' ' 
2yp =(A9) P1 
p 
= 2 - c5(1-a)/(2a-l) , and zc5 a(l -a)/(2a - 1) 
if (1 +cS)/(2 +c5) > a _::_ 2/ (4 - c5) , and 
p yP(AlO) c5 , and zc5a(2 - c5) , otherwise.P1 = = 
In a hierarchy, direct computations using (A7) show that an internal 
solution is always dominated by one of the corner solutions. A comparison 
among the corner solutions yields 
1H 2H 2YH(All) = = 1 , and = za - z (1 - a) (1 - c5) , if a > (1- cS)/(2 --o) ,P1 P1 
and 
1H 2H yH(Al2) = 1 , = c5 , and = zac5 , otherwise.P1 P1 
Interchanging 1s in (Al2) provides an alternative (but equivalent) optimalp1 
screening rule, under which a hierarchy rejects all bad projects. 
Note the following results. Both systems adopt the highest (lowest) 
reservation level at low (high) values of a . But, the level of a below 
(above) which a hierarchy adopts this rule is lower than the corresponding 
A4 
level of a in a polyarchy. Second, the reservation level is higher in 
both systems (either continuously, or in steps) if a is lower. 
The relative profit level is calculated as t:,Y = Yp - YH • First, 
take the range: 0 <a< (1 - o)/(2 - o) • In this range, expressions (AlO) 
and (Al2) apply, and t:,Y = zao(l - o) > 0 • Second, take the range: 
2/(4 - o) >a> (1 - o)/(2 - o) • In this range, (AlO) and (All) apply, 
and t:,Y = z(l - 2a) (1 - o) 2 . Thus, t:,Y 
<
> 0 , if 1/2 ~ a • Third, take 
the range (1 + o) / (2 + o) > a > 2/ ( 4 - o) • In this range, (A9) and (All) 
apply, and a(t:,Y)/aa < O • Evaluating t:,Y at a= 2/(4 - o) , we find 
that t:,Y < 0 Thus, t:,Y < 0 within this range is a • Finally, take the 
range 1 >a> (1 + o)/(2 + o) • Expressions (AB) and (All) apply in this 
case, and t:,Y = 2z(l - a)o(o - 1) < O • Therefore, the result: t:,Y 
<
> 0 
if 1/2 ~ a applies to the entire range of a. 
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1. In fact, quite the contrary view has sometimes been put forward. The 
Lange-Lerner~Taylor equivalence theorem, for example, argued that a 
market economy and a bureaucratic economy using a price system behave 
in an essentially identical manner. This equivalence theorem, however, 
is based on models of both socialist and market economies which fail 
to capture the salient characteristics of either form of economic 
organization. See Frederick von Hayek (1935), Oskar Lange and Fred 
Taylor (1964), Ludwig von Mises (_1935), among others, on the market 
socialism debate. 
2. Of course, there are other ways in which market- and bureaucracy­
oriented economies may differ. Among those advanced in the li tera­
ture are: prices versus quantity as tools of allocation [see Martin 
Weitzman's (1974) classic paper], and private versus public (collec­
tive) ownership of resources. 
F2 
3. This is essentially the view embedded in the standard Arrow-Debreu 
model of the economy. In their analysis, finns do not engage in the 
collection and analysis of information; firms have a simple once-and­
for-all decision to make; they just find the book of blueprints de­
scribing the optimal production plan corresponding to various sets 
of relative prices. 
4. This is, for instance, the view that has been emphasized by Nalebuff 
and Stiglitz (_1983). It should be noted that we ignore incentive 
issues in this paper not because they are unimportant, but because 
we feel that they have been discussed extensively elsewhere, while 
the particular issues upon which we focus attention here have not. 
S. Further advantage cited by those who view themselves to be innovative, 
non-bureaucratic people is that in polyarchies such people do better. 
The differences in the types of people who are successful within dif­
ferent organizational forms, who obtain decision making positions, 
may play an important part in the differences in organizational per­
formance. We shall comment on this briefly below. 
6. A screen may, at present, be thought of as a black box which flashes 
a light when it deems a project to be good. More detailed interpre­
tations of the screening process are described below. 
7. We assume here that a firm can not distinguish between the projects 
which are being evaluated for the first time from those which have 
been rejected by the other firm. This can be visualized as follows. 
An identical initial portfolio of projects arrives in each period, it 
takes one full period to examine projects, and firms do not share any 
F3 
in.formation with one another. A firm in a particular period, then, 
evaluates a portfolio consisting of the new projects which it received 
in the beginning of the period, and the projects which were rejected 
by the other firm in the previous period, without being able to dis­
tinguish between the two categories of projects. 
8. Th.is scalar valuation includes all relevant benefits and costs. Also, 
we are assuming that the inter-project externalities are not signifi­
cant (.that is, the profit from one project does not depend significantly 
on whether some other projects are undertaken or not), and that there 
is no restriction on the number of projects that can be undertaken. 
0£ course, this is not the only formulation which one can use for com­
paring alternative economic systems. We later discuss another formu­
lation in which only a fixed number of projects can be undertaken. 
9. In a polyarchy, the probability that a project which goes to the first 
firm is approved is p(x) • It gets rejected with probability 
1 - p(x) ; the probability that it then gets approved by the second 
firm is again p(x) • Hence the total probability of acceptance is 
p(x) + (1 - p(x))p(x) = p(x)(2 - p(x)) Similarly, in a hierarchy, 
the probability that a project is approved by the lower bureau is 
p(x)_ • The probability that the same project given to the higher bureau 
is approved is again p(x) Hence, the probability of a project being 
approved is p2(x) • This analysis asswnes that the decisions (judg­
ments) are independent across screens and projects. 
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10. Portfolios containing only profitable projects, or only unprofitable 
projects are not worth considering since, if project evaluators know 
what kind of portfolio it is, then the issue of screening disappears 
altogether. 
11. We assume at present that the screening costs depend only on the number 
of screens. Then the costs can be suppressed because they do not af­
fect our conclusions. Other formulations of screening costs are dis­
cussed later. Also, we assume that if there is uncertainty in the 
outcome of projects, then the probability of acceptance of a project 
by a screen, p(x) , depends only on the expected profit, x, of 
the project. 
12. The last condition merely rules out those uninteresting cases in which 
all projects are either accepted, or rejected. 
13. The subscripts of p's denote the variable with respect to which a 
partial derivative is being taken. 
14. This can be seen directly in Figure 3. 
15. We suppress the number of proej cts, N , in the expressions for 
Y8 and ~y , throughout the rest of the paper. 
16. This is simply because the relative advantage of a hierarchy is in 
rejecting bad projects, whereas the relative advantage of a polyarchy 
is in accepting good projects. If the initial portfolio worsens, that 
is if there are more bad projects, then the former advantage becomes 
increasingly more important and the relative performance of a hierarchy 
improves. However, we must emphasize that, in general, the probability 
FS 
that a project is accepted or rejected by a. screen (that is, the rules 
for project acceptance and rejection) will be affected by the mix of 
available projects. One might suspect, for instance, that if there 
were a large proportion of bad projects, screening would become rela­
tively tighter in a polyarchy, and this might improve its relative 
performance. Thus, the kind of comparative statics conducted here, 
where only one parameter is changed at a time, must be treated with 
caution. Endogenous screening functions are discussed later. 
17. In fact, the same approach can be ·used even when the initial portfolios 
are entirely different ih the two systems. Take the general case in 
swhich, for i = 1 and 2, N7 is the nunber of projects, and z. 
1 1 
is the positive number denoting the profit or loss from a project of 
type i in the system s • Then the center of hyperbolas is given 
P P P P __H H
by pi= N.z./[N.z. + ~:z.] . The slopes of the asymptotes are
1 1 1 1 1 1 
p p __H H pp H H 1/2 
~ [(Nlzl + ~1z1)/(N2z2 + N2z2)] . Other relevant details, as well 
as various special cases, can be easily worked out. 
18. This, of course, begs the question of the optimal number of screens. 
We have analyzed this question in our 1985a paper. 
19. In fact, under such a situation, there exist parent distributions, 
g(_x) , for which a particular mean preserving spread wi 11 increase 
~y, whereas some other mean preserving spread will decrease ~y . 
See Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970). 
20. More generally, if p(x) is a polynomial of degree m then, from (4), 
Ys is a function of up to (2m + 1) moments of the distribution of 
the initial portfolio. 
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. 21. The mean is likely to be negative because, typically, unprofitable 
ideas outnwnber profitable ones. 
22. For example, if an impartial outsider provides binary information on 
projects (a project is good or bad), and if there is no information 
sharing between screens, then the profit maximizing decision rule (that 
is, whether to act according to, or contrary to, the outsider's advice) 
gives rise to identical screening functions in the two systems in all 
circumstances except one. The exception arises when a hierarchy's 
optimal decision rule is such that one bureau acts according to the 
outsider's advice, while the other acts contrary to it. 
23. We assume, however, that a firm has the information whether a project 
was evaluated earlier by them or not, and the firm uses this informa­
tion to prevent a project from being evaluated more than once. 
24. In our model, an individual observes a variable y, which is a signal 
concerning the mean profit x • Clearly, in this simple case, the in­
dividual could, in principle, communicate all that he knows. But our 
objective is to provide some insights into the more general situation, 
where individuals observe a multi-dimensional set of variables, which 
they integrate with their priors, to form a judgment; they can neither 
communicate all of what they have observed concerning the project, nor 
can they fully articulate their priors. 
25. Note that optimal policies can be characterized in terms of a single 
reservation level only if some mild regularity conditions are satisfied 
by th_e nature of the error terms. An example where these conditions 
are not satisfied is as follows. If there are two types of projects, 
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and if the variance of observation errors on the bad project is much 
larger than that on the good project, it may be the case that a very 
high value of y is more likely to correspond to a bad project than 
is a somewhat lower value of y . Such anomalies are common in sta­
tistical decision theory. 
26. Provided (R - x) is between the two end points of the distribution 
of e . 
27. This is an ilJustratioti of our earlier remark that the independence.,, 
of firms within a polyarchy imposes some costs on the system. A poly­
archy's profit YP tn the present case is, in general, smaller than 
in the hypothetical case in which there is no independence and, con­
sequently, the reservation levels for both firms can be set at levels 
which maximize yP Also, note that the above externality is quite 
different from the one in which the return from a project depends on 
whether that project (or some other set of projects) is undertaken 
by other firms. The latter is the more familiar externality which 
provides the usual argument for coordinated decision making. 
28. Clearly, may not always equal But the symmetry of p 1 
2and p in (17) shows that if the optimum is unique and internal then 
1R H must equal R2H . Later, when we make the accuracy of screening 
1a control variable, we shall see that YH is not symmetric in p 
2and p 
29. If p(O) is the probability of acceptance for a project with zero 
profit, then the right hand side of (18) is 
The last term is negative because 
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PR< 0 , and p(x) ~ p(O) if x ~ 0 . Using this, (18) yields: 
{2 - p(O)}E[xpR] < 0 or, equivalently, E[xpR] < 0 . Hence both sides 
of (18) must be negative. 
30. This conservatism is reflected in market economies by firms insist­
ing on a high expected return in order to undertake a project. For 
example, firms often have a decision rule that only projects with an 
expected return in excess of 20 percent be undertaken, but the actual 
average returns are considerably smaller. Firms know that to attain 
the required return, they have to set high reservation levels. 
31. If y1 and y2 do not overlap, that is, if min y1 > max y 2 , then 
the decision problem disappears because perfect selection is possible 
by setting R in the non-overlapping region. We do not concern our­
selves with these situations. 
32. In addition, the result we noted earlier, that a polyarchy screens 
more conservatively than a hierarchy, can be confirmed for this example, 
even though the optimum here entails corner solutions, and the reser­
vation levels for the two bureaus in a hierarchy are not always the 
same. Specifically, both systems employ reservation levels which 
lead to the rejection of all bad projects when the mix of projects 
is very bad. However, the proportion of good projects below which a 
hierarchy adopts such a policy is lower than the corresponding propor­
tion in a polyarchy. Similarly, when the mix of projects is very good, 
both systems employ rules under which all good projects are accepted; 
but the proportion of good projects above which a hierarchy adopts 
this rule is lower than the corresponding proportion in a polyarchy. 
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33. In the present formulation, although a screen makes only one observa­
tion, the accuracy of its observation is a choice variable. A more 
accurate observation has an increasingly higher cost; that is, C 
is increasing and convex in 8 • An alternative formulation is the 
one in which the accuracy of observation is fixed and the cost per 
observation is also fixed, but a screen can make as many observations 
as it wants. In this case, the optimal information gathering will 
be characterized by a sequential sample plan • 
.. 
34. Because ea.ch firm in the polyarchy has" all the rejected projects of 
the other firm, it faces a greater proportion of bad projects than 
even the lower bureau in a hierarchy. 
35. Note that a hierarchy can be viewed as a special case of a conuni ttee 
in which approval requires unanimity. A polyarchy, on the other hand, 
can be viewed as a committee in which approval requires only a single 
vo.te. Such a view, however, abstracts from important aspects of the 
sequence of decision making. See our 1985a paper for an extensive 
analysis of the performance of committees. 
36. The probability of acceptance of a project in an acceptance hierarchy 
is p 2 The probability of being rejected by the first unit in a 
veto polyarchy is 1 - p , and that of being rejected by the second 
unit (given that the project has not been rejected by the first unit) 
is 1 - p . Thus, the total probability of being rejected is 
1 - p + p(l - p) = 1 - p 
2 Hence, the probability of acceptance is 
just p 2 Also, the number of evaluations is the same in these two 
systems. 
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37. We can think of there being a fixed number of dam sites. The question 
then is, which projects to place at various sites. In the present 
analysis, the opportunity cost of dam sites is endogenous; in the rest 
of the paper, the opportunity cost of dam sites is taken as exogenous. 
38. For example, our model for determining screening rules can be extended 
to include the possible effect of individuals' efforts on errors, and 
the effort-reward trade off which is optimal in each of the two sys­
tems. Also, there may be incentive problems associated with whether 
it is in the interest of individuals to share information. Note, how­
ever, that the incentive structure may not always be critical in deter­
mining individuals' performance; it may not take much more effort to 
make a good decision than a bad one, but it may take much more ability. 
39. It might be useful here to comment on a particular definition of hier­
archy which sometimes arises in economic discussions. According to 
this definition, a 'hierarchy' is a supra-organizational entity which 
can adopt whatever organizational form it desires. Not surprisingly, 
a hierarchy--so defined--is always a better system since it has extra 
degrees of control (in choosing its organizational form) compared to 
any specific organizational form. This definition is not very useful, 
since all it says (tautologically) is that a society which can choose 
among various organizational forms is better than the one which can't. 
In any case, if one uses the above definition, then our analysis can 
be viewed as delineating conditions under which this 'hierarchy' should 
organize itself as a polyarchy or a hierarchy (as we have defined it). 
40. The comparative historical study by Alfred Chandler (1962), for instance, 
points to such corporate responses. 
Rl 
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